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MAKING A FEDERAL CASE OUT OF IT: SUPPLEMENTAL 
JURISDICTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Section 1367 of the Judicial Improvement Act of 1990' ("Act") 
codifies the common law doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdic-
tion under one concept of "supplemental jurisdiction." Applicable 
to actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990, section 1367 
represents a significant expansion of the right to invoke federal court 
jurisdiction for the adjudication of state law claims that are transac-
tionally related to litigation in federal court. Nevertheless, section 
1367 remains largely misunderstood and overlooked. One commen-
tator has suggested that because this section was enacted in the 
context of an act encompassing a host of other changes, including 
generally mundane items pertaining to federal judicial administration, 
the Act as a whole has served to obscure the importance of the new 
rules governing a civil litigant's choice of a federal forum.2 As a 
result, the practicing bar may be largely unaware of these new rules. 
Even where an awareness exists, it is generally unaccompanied by 
informed understanding of the significance of the changes.3 
This Comment first discusses the old system of pendent and 
ancillary jurisdiction. The Comment then reviews the new system 
implemented under section 1367 and explores Congress' motivations 
and intentions in enacting the Act. Finally, it discusses some of the 
ambiguities that exist under the Act and predicts, based upon an 
analysis of congressional intent, how these ambiguities should be 
resolved. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Ancillary Jurisdiction 
The doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction permits the joinder of 
claims and parties over which a federal court would lack subject 
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. 1991). 
2. John B. Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction 
and Venue: The Judicial Improvements Acts of 1988 and 1990,24 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REv. 735, 735-37 (1991). 
3. Id. at 737; see also Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Grasping at Burnt 
Straws: The Disaster of the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 
963 (1991) [hereinafter Arthur & Freer, Burnt Straws]; Richard D. Freer, 
Compounding Confusion And Hampering Diversity: Life After Finley and the 
Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445 (1991) [hereinafter Freer, 
Compounding Confusion]. 
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matter jurisdiction if they were presented separately. 4 The rationale 
underlying this doctrine is that when a federal court has either 
diversity or federal Question jurisdiction over an existing claim and 
one set of parties, other closely related claims and parties may be 
joined to the lawsuit.5 "Ancillary jurisdiction exists because without 
it the federal court neither could dispose of the principal case 
effectively nor do complete justice in the dispute that is before the 
tribunal."6 Additionally, ancillary jurisdiction is consistent with the 
procedural goals of liberal joinder outlined in the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.7 The ancillary jurisdiction doctrine makes multiparty 
litigation feasible by dispensing with the need for an independent 
basis of subject matter jurisdiction for all claims and parties in an 
individual lawsuit. 8 
Ancillary jurisdiction has been applied to the following claims 
and parties: Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) compulsory counterclaims;9 Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 13(g) cross-claims;IO Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(h) joinder of 
additional parties to compulsory counterclaims;1I Fed. R. Civ. P. 14 
impleader of third-party defendants for claims by and against third-
party plaintiffs and claims by third-party defendants, but not for 
claims by the original plaintiff against third-party defendants; 12 Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 22 interpleader;13 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) intervention 
as of right. 14 On the other hand, ancillary jurisdiction has been held 
4. CHARLES A. WIUGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 28 (4th ed. 1983) [hereinafter 
WIUGHT, FEDERAL COURTS]. See generally David D. Siegel, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 
practice commentary 219, 220 (Supp. 1991) (citing Federman v. Empire Fire 
& Marine Ins. Co., 597 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1979». 
5. See generally JACK H. FIUEDENTHAL ET AL., CIvn. PROCEDURE §§ 2.12, 2.14, 
at 66 (1985); 13 CHARLES A. WIUGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 3523, at 82 (1984 & Supp. 1992) [hereinafter WIUGHT, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE]. 
6. 13 WIUGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 5, § 3523, at 85. 
7. See Oakley, supra note 2, at 758-59. 
8. See generally 13 WIUGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 5, § 3523, at 86. 
9. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 5, § 2.14, at 77 & n.12 (citing United States 
ex rei. D'Agostino Excavators, Inc. v. Heyward-Robinson Co., 430 F.2d 1077 
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971); Berger v. Reynolds Metals 
Co., 39 F.R.D. 313 (E.D. Fa. 1966». 
10. See Amco Constr. Co. v. Mississippi State Bldg. Comm'n, 602 F.2d 730 (5th 
Cir. 1979); City of Boston v. Boston Edison Co., 260 F.2d 872, 874-75 (1st 
Cir. 1958); Hoosier Casualty Co. v. Fox, 102 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Iowa 1952). 
11. See, e.g., United Artists Corp. v. Masterpiece Prods., Inc., 221 F.2d 213 (2d 
Cir. 1955), superseded by 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. 1991). 
12. See Pennsylvania R.R. v. Erie Ave. Warehouse Co., 302 F.2d 843, 845 (3d 
Cir. 1962); Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959). See also Owen Equip. 
& Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978) (disallowing ancillary jurisdiction 
over a Rule 14(a) claim asserted by the plaintiff against a third-party defendant), 
superseded by 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. 1991). 
13. See, e.g., Walmac Co. v. Isaacs, 220 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1955). 
14. See, e.g., Lenz v. Wagner, 240 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1957). 
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inapplicable to the following claims and parties = Fed. R. Civ. P. 
13(b) permissive counterclaims; 15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 18 joinder of 
claims;16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b) indispensable parties;17 Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 20 permissive joinder of parties;18 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) 
permissive intervention. 19 
Generally, the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine has been applied to 
allow federal courts to hear state law claims asserted by litigants in 
a defensive posture, or by persons whose rights might be irretrievably 
lost unless they asserted them in an ongoing action in federal court.20 
Conversely, an original plaintiff's right to use ancillary jurisdiction 
has been more limited. For instance, a plaintiff cannot use ancillary 
jurisdiction to secure subject matter jurisdiction over a defendant 
when it would otherwise be lacking.21 
Ancillary jurisdiction, and the formulation of section 1367, were 
influenced by Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger.22 In Owen 
Equipment, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death diversity action 
against a utility company for negligently maintaining a power line 
that electrocuted her husband. 23 Plaintiff was a resident of Iowa; the 
utility company was a Nebraska corporation.24 The utility company 
filed a third-party claim against Owen, an Iowa corporation, alleging 
that Owen had caused the accident by negligently operating a crane, 
and, therefore, should indemnify the utility company against any 
judgment obtained by the plaintiff.25 The plaintiff then amended her 
complaint to include a claim against Owen and sought to overcome 
the absence of complete diversity between herself and Owen by using 
the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction.26 
IS. See, e.g., Poloron Prods., Inc. v. Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery, 66 
F.R.D. 610, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 534 F.2d 1012 (2d 
Cir. 1976). 
16. See, e.g., Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat'l. Bank, SIS F.2d 1200 (5th 
Cir. 1975); Thornton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 492 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1980). 
Such claims may involve pendent jurisdiction. 
17. See, e.g., Chance v. County Bd. of Sch. Trustees, 332 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 
1964). 
18. F'IuEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 5, § 2.14, at 78 & n.23 (stating that "the 
extension of jurisdiction over parties joined under Rule 20 is more properly 
denominated 'pendent party' jurisdiction"). 
19. See, e.g., Hougen v. Merkel, 47 F.R.D. 528 (D. Minn. 1969). 
20. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 376 (1978); see also 
13 WIUGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 5, § 3523, at 104. 
21. Siegel, supra note 4, at 220-21 (citing Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 
437 U.S. 365 (1978». 
22. 437 U.S. 365 (1978). 
23. [d. at 367. 
24. [d. 
25. [d. at 367-68. 
26. [d. at 368, 370. Interestingly, Owen was initially thought to be diverse from 
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The United States Supreme Court held that the doctrine of 
ancillary jurisdiction could not be used to grant subject matter 
jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim against Owen. 27 The Court 
emphasized the limited nature of the federal courts' jurisdiction.28 
According to the Court, the federal courts are limited by the Con-
stitution and by Congress' statutory directives, and these limits must 
not be disregarded or evaded. 29 The Court reasoned that by allowing 
use of the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine in situations where a plaintiff 
has asserted a claim against a third-party defendant, "a plaintiff 
could defeat the statutory requirement of complete diversity by the 
simple expedient of suing only those defendants who were of diverse 
citizenship and waiting' for them to implead non-diverse defen-
dants. "30 
Additionally, the Court noted that in determining whether juris-
diction over a nonfederal claim exists, it is crucial to examine the 
context in which that nonfederal claim is asserted. 31 In Owen Equip-
ment, the plaintiff's claim against Owen was not dependent upon 
her claim against the original defendant, the utility company, in the 
same way that the utility company's claim for indemnity against 
Owen was dependent upon the original claim.32 Further, the non fed-
eral claim in Owen Equipment was asserted by the plaintiff, who 
"voluntarily chose to bring suit upon a state law claim in a federal 
court. "33 The Court contrasted this situation with that of "a defend-
ing party haled into court against his will, or . . . another person 
whose rights might be irretrievably lost unless he could assert them 
the plaintiff, Kroger. [d. at 368-69. When Kroger amended her complaint, she 
named Owen as a Nebraska corporation with its principal p!ace of business in 
Nebraska. [d. In its answer, Owen admitted that it was a corporation organized 
and existing under the laws of Nebraska. [d. at 369. At trial, however, Owen 
disclosed that its principal place of business was in Iowa. [d. 
27. [d. at 375-77. 
28. [d. at 372-74. 
29. [d. at 374. 
30. [d. 
31. [d. at 375-76. 
32. [d. at 376. The Court noted that the non federal claim in this case was not 
ancillary to the federal one in the same way that the defendant's impleader of 
a third-party defendant is always ancillary. [d. For example, a third-party 
complaint depends, in part, upon the resolution of the primary lawsuit. [d. 
Therefore, the third-party complaint's relation to the original complaint is not 
"mere factual similarity but logical dependence." [d. In Owen Equipment, 
however, the plaintiff's claim against Owen was entirely separate from her 
original claim against the utility company since Owen's liability to the plaintiff 
did not depend upon whether or not the utility company was also liable. [d. 
"Far from being an ancillary and dependent claim, it was a new and inde-
pendent one." [d. 
33. [d. 
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irr an ongoing action in a federal court. "34 The Court concluded that 
"[a] plaintiff cannot complain if ancillary jurisdiction does not 
encompass all of his possible claims in a case ... , since it is he who 
has chosen the federal rather than the state forum and must thus 
accept its limitations. "35 If the plaintiff in Owen Equipment was 
striving for the efficiency of trying all her claims in one forum, the 
Court suggested that she look to the state courts.36 
B. Pendent Jurisdiction 
The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction allows a plaintiff who has 
a jurisdictionally sufficient federal question or federal law claim to 
join related state law claims.37 The test for whether pendent jurisdic-
tion exists over a state law claim was established by the Supreme 
Court in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.38 In that case, Gibbs was 
involved in a rivalry between the United Mine Workers ("UMW") 
and the Southern Labor Union over representation of mirre workers 
in the southern Appalachian coal fields. 39 Gibbs supported the Southern 
Labor Union. 4O Ultimately, the UMW prevailed and, apparently due 
to his support of the Southern Labor Union, Gibbs lost his job and 
was unable to locate employment in the region.41 Gibbs filed an 
action in federal district court alleging that the UMW had caused 
his misfortunes by engaging in a secondary boycott in violation of 
section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act.42 Gibbs also 
raised a separate claim alleging that the UMW's conduct amounted 
to an illegal conspiracy under state law. 43 Because diversity of citi-
zenship was lacking, Gibbs confronted the scope of the pendent 
jurisdiction doctrine. 
The Gibbs Court held that, as a matter of constitutional power, 
pendent jurisdiction exists as long as the state and federal claims 
"derive from a common nucleus of operative fact,"44 and are so 
related that the plaintiff "would ordinarily be expected to try them 




37. See generally Siegel, supra note 4, at 220. 
38. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
39. Id. at 718. 
40. Id. at 720. 
41. Id. at 718-20. 
42. Id. at 717 (citing Labor Management Relations Act, § 303, 61 Stat. 158 (1947) 
(current version at 29 U .S.C. § 187 (1988))). 
43. Id. at 720. 
44. Id. at 725. 
45.Id. 
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ever, between a court's constitutional power to hear the pendent state 
claim, and its discretion in using that power. 46 The exercise of this 
discretion should be based on "considerations of judicial economy, 
convenience and fairness to litigants .... Needless decisions of state 
law should be avoided .... ' '47 The Gibbs Court stated that if the 
federal claims are dismissed before trial, for example, on a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion, the court should decline to exercise its discretion to 
hear the pendent state claim. 48 If the federal claims were dismissed 
on the merits, the court would have the discretion to decide the 
pendent state claim;' however, according to the Court, the exercise 
of this discretion would be unwise.49 "Similarly, if it appears that 
the state issues substantially predominate, . . . the state claims may 
be dismissed without prejudice and left for resolution to state tri-
bunals. "SO 
c. Pendent Parties: The Finley Decision 
The pendent jurisdiction doctrine is usually invoked by parties 
to a federal claim who are raising a separate state claim.51 A different 
issue exists, however, when an additional party is added to the state 
but not to the federal law claim. 52 This situation involves the doctrine 
of pendent party jurisdiction.53 
The Supreme Court initially addressed the doctrine of pendent 
party jurisdiction in Aldinger v. Howard. 54 Aldinger was fired from 
her job in the county treasurer's office without a hearing. 55 She 
brought suit in federal district court against the treasurer, the county 
and several county officers claiming that her discharge violated her 
federal constitutional rights under section 1983, and alleging, there-
fore, that she was entitled to injunctive relief and damages. 56 Addi-
tionally, she asserted state law claims against the partiesY Jurisdiction 
over the federal claim was predicated upon section 1343(3), whereas 
jurisdiction over the state claims was predicated upon the doctrine 
of pendent parties.58 Section 1343(3) of the statute gave the federal 
46. See id. 
47. Id. at 726. 
48.ld. 
49.ld. 
50. Id. at 726-27. 
51. Siegel, supra note 4, at 221. 
52.ld. 
53. Id. 
54. 427 U.S. 1 (1976). 
55. Id. at 3. 
56. Id. at 3-4. 
57. Id. at 4. 
58.ld. 
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district courts jurisdiction over "any civil action authorized by law 
to be commenced by any person" to redress the deprivation, under 
color of state law, of federal constitutional rights. 59 As to the county, 
the district court dismissed the action finding that because the county 
could not be sued as a "person" under section 1983, no independent 
basis of jurisdiction existed.60 Therefore, the court held that it lacked 
the power to exercise pendent party jurisdiction over the claim.61 The 
court of appeals affirmed and an appeal was taken to the Supreme 
. Court.62 . 
On appeal, Aldinger argued that according to Gibbs, the Federal 
Rules strongly encourage the joinder of claims, parties and remedies,63 
and therefore, her use of the Rules was a matter of jurisdictional 
power limited only by whether the claim against the county '''de-
rive [d) from a common nucleus of operative fact. "'64 Thus, she 
argued that based on the treatment of pendent claims in Gibbs and 
the use of ancillary jurisdiction to join additional parties, her non-
federal claim against a nonfederal defendant fell within pendent party 
jurisdiction and satisfied the Gibbs test on its face. 65 
The Court declined to allow pendent jurisdiction over the state 
law claim presented, and held that in determining whether jurisdiction 
over a nonfederal claim exists the context in which the nonfederal 
claim is asserted is crucial.66 The Court noted that the joinder of a 
new party, as Aldinger requested, was both factually and legally 
different from the situation that faced the Court in Gibbs.67 The 
Court stated that 
[f]rom a purely factual point of view, it is one thing to 
authorize two parties, already present in federal court by 
virtue of a case over which the court has jurisdiction, to 
litigate in addition to their federal claim a state law claim 
over which there is no independent basis of federal juris-
diction. But it is quite another thing to permit a plaintiff, 
who has asserted a claim against one defendant with respect 
to which there is federal jurisdiction, to join an entirely 
different defendant on the basis of a state law claim over 
which there is no independent basis of federal jurisdiction, 
simply because his claim against the first defendant and his 
59. [d. at 4 n.3. 
60. [d. at 5. 
61. [d. 
62. [d. at 3. 
63. [d. at 12 (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966». 
64. [d. at 12 (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725). 
65. [d. at 12-13. 
66. [d. at 14-16. 
67. [d. at 14. 
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claim against the second defendant "derive from a common 
nucleus of operative fact."68 
Additionally, the Court acknowledged that permitting jurisdic-
tion over the pendent state law claim would serve the same consid-
erations of judicial economy mentioned in Gibbs insofar as plaintiff's 
claims were "such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them 
all in one judicial proceeding."69 However, "the addition of a com-
pletely new party would run counter to the well-established principle 
that federal· courts, as opposed to state trial courts of general 
jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction .... "70 In contrast to 
the reaction to Gibbs, Congress did not remain silent. 71 Through the 
express language of the statute, Congress specifically excluded parties 
such as counties from liability under section 1983, and therefore, by 
reference in the grant of jurisdiction under section 1343(3) as well. 72 
The Court held that a fair reading of the language used in section 
1343, together with the scope of section 1983, required that the 
joinder of a municipal corporation, for purposes of asserting a state 
law claim not within federal diversity jurisdiction was without the 
statutory jurisdiction of the district court.73 As noted by Professor 
Siegel, however, this conclusion did not address "whether pendent 
party jurisdiction might be allowed at least in the case in which the 
federal claim is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, 
thus making it impossible to find a single forum for both claims by 
joining the federal one in a state action. "74 
The Court addressed Aldinger's unanswered questions in Finley 
v. United States.7S In Finley, the plaintiff was the widow of a pilot 
who, with two of the plaintiff's children, had been killed when his 
private plane struck power lines while approaching a municipal 
airport under the air traffic control of the federal government. 76 The 
plaintiff sued the federal government in federal district court because 
this was the only forum available to her under the exclusive juris-
diction mandated by the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA").77 In 
her amended complaint, the plaintiff sought to join as defendants 
the municipal owner and operator of the airport as well as the power 
company responsible for illuminating the electric transmission lines 
68. [d. (quoting Gibbs, 383 u.s. at 725). 
69. [d. at 14-15. 
70. [d. at 15. 
71. [d. 
72. [d. at 16. 
73. [d. at 17. 
74. Siegel, supra note 4, at 221. 
75. 490 U.S. 545 (1989); see also Siegel, supra note 4, at 221. 
76. Finley, 490 U.S. at 546. 
77. [d. at 546-47. 
1992) Supplemental Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 75 
with which the plane collided. 78 Since diversity jurisdiction did not 
exist, the federal court lacked an independent jurisdictional basis to 
adjudicate plaintiff's claims against the pendent party defendants.79 
In a five to four decision, the Court rejected the application of 
pendent party jurisdiction even in this compelling situation.80 The 
majority opinion authored by Justice Scalia implied that, unless 
Congress had affirmatively stated in this particular statute that new 
parties to related pendent state law claims may be brought into the 
federal litigation, such pendent party jurisdiction would not be al-
lowed.81 According to the Court, Congress remained silent about 
whether additional parties to pendent state claims could be added 
where the jurisdiction was based upon the FTCA.82 The Court 
interpreted this silence to indicate that the plaintiff could not join 
the additional defendants. 83 The Court stated that "with respect to 
the addition of parties, as opposed to the addition of only claims, 
we will not assume that the full constitutional power has been 
congressionally authorized, and will not read jurisdictional statutes 
broadly. "84 
The majority was not oblivious to the possible need for a 
legislative response to the problem presented in Finley. The Court 
stated that "[w]hatever we say regarding the scope of jurisdiction 
. . . can of course be changed by Congress., What is of paramount 
importance is that Congress be able to legislate against a background 
of clear interpretative rules, so that it may know the effect of the 
language it adopts."8s According to the majority, proper respect for 
the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts forbade the exercise of 
pendent party jurisdiction absent a clear congressional authorization. 86 
Justice Stevens, in dissent, argued that pendent party jurisdiction 
should be allowed at least in cases, like this one, where the dispute 
between all the parties derives from a "common nucleus of operative 
fact" and the forum is the only one in which all claims against the 
parties can be heard.87 The dissenters would have followed precedent 
78. Id. at 546. 
79.Id. 
80. Id. at 556. 
81. See id. at 554-56. 
82. Id. at 552-54. 
83. Id. at 553. 
84. Id. at 549. 
85. Id. at 556. 
86. Id. at 548-49. "As regards all courts of the United States inferior to this 
tribunal, two things are necessary to create jurisdiction, whether original or 
appellate. The Constitution must have given to the court capacity to take it, 
and an act of Congress must have supplied it .... " Id. (quoting Mayor v. 
Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1868». 
87. Id. at 569-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was joined in dissent by 
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and interpreted this congressional silence to mean that pendent party 
jurisdiction would be allowed.88 The consequence of the majority 
approach, the dissent noted, was that the plaintiff would have to 
pursue one suit against the United States in federal court, then waste 
judicial resources by relitigating many of the same facts in a separate 
state court suit against the other defendants. 89 In addition to the 
criticism noted by the dissent, the Finley decision also provided a 
substantial possibility of an inconsistent outcome if the state and 
federal claims were separately adjudicated. A combination of findings 
in two separate courts could leave a plaintiff clearly entitled to a 
remedy but wholly without recourse if each court concluded that the 
only liable party was the defendant before the other court. 
D. Motivations and Concerns of Congress in Enacting 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367 
In enacting the new section 1367, Congress accepted the Finley 
Court's suggestion to legislate on the meaning of supplemental juris-
diction. In the House of Representatives report introducing the 
statute, the legislators acknowledged that jurisdiction· under the an-
cillary and pendent doctrines had "enabled federal courts and litigants 
to take advantage of th~ federal procedural rules on claim and party 
joinder to deal economically - in single rather than multiple litigation 
- with related matters, usually those arising from the same transac-
tion, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences."90 More-
over, by exercising supplemental jurisdiction, the district courts would 
make the federal courts a practical arena for the resolution of an 
entire controversy and effectuate "Congress' intent in the jurisdic-
tional statutes to provide plaintiffs with a federal forum for litigating 
claims within original federal jurisdiction. "91 
Congress specifically cited Finley as an example of the Supreme 
Court "cast[ing] substantial doubt on the authority of federal courts 
to hear some claims within supplemental jurisdiction. "92 The report 
stated that the Court's rationale in this case "threaten[ed] to eliminate 
other previously accepted forms of supplemental jurisdiction. "93 As 
further evidence of the necessity of a congressional statement on this 
Justices Brennan and Marshall. Justice Blackmun filed a separate dissenting 
opinion. 
88. Id. at 573-75 (citing Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976». 
89. Id. at 576-77. 
90. H.R. REp. No. 734, WIst Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
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matter, Congress noted that "some lower courts have interpreted 
Finley to prohibit the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in formerly 
unquestioned circumstances."94 Thus, Congress took the initiative to 
create this statute and stated that "[t]his section would authorize. 
jurisdiction in a case like Finley, as well as essentially restore the 
pre-Finley understandings of the authorization for and the limits on 
other forms of supplemental jurisdiction.' '95 
With regard to federal question cases, the statute "broadly 
authorizes the district courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over additional claims, including claims involving joinder of addi-
tional parties."96 In diversity cases, the statute authorizes the district 
courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, "except when doing so 
would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of the 
diversity statute.' '97 
The doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction "traditionally 
have been thought to permit a federal court to adjudicate state law 
claims over which the court has no express statutory jurisdiction," 
and their use, therefore, raises concerns regarding federalism.98 "These 
concerns magnify when a federal court decides state law claims that 
far outdistance their federal counterparts in novelty, complexity, or 
importance."99 Further, "when jurisdictionally insufficient state law 
claims overrun a lawsuit, they may greatly increase a federal district 
court's" workload}OO For years, a debate has raged over whether 
federal district courts should continue the practice of handling di-
versity cases. IOI In reaction to criticism over the diversity jurisdiction 
of the federal courts, Congress raised the amount in controversy 
requirement from $10,000 to $50,000. 102 Implicitly recognizing these 
concerns, Congress stated in the legislative history of section 1367 
that "in both [federal question and diversity] cases, the district courts, 
as under current law, would have discretion to decline supplemental 
jurisdiction in appropriate circumstances.' '103 
94. Id. & n.14 (citing Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Spartan Mechanical Corp., 
738 F. Supp. 664, 673-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (impleader) (reviewing conflicting 
district court decisions». 
95. Id. at 6874. 
96.Id. 
97.Id. 
98. Thomas M. Mengler, The Demise of Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 1990 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 247, 249. 
99.Id. 
100. Id. 
101. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 5, § 2.5, at 25 & n.7. 
102. See Report of Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, 
reprinted at 150 Congo Rec. H13301-07 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) at 14-15 
(justifying recommendation to abolish diversity jurisdiction on grounds that 
the federal courts should primarily resolve disputes over federal law). 
103. H.R. REp. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6873, 6874. 
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III. OPERATION OF SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION 
UNDER SECTION 1367 
A. Subsection (a) 
Subsection (a) of the new section 1367 states the general rule 
regarding supplemental jurisdiction: 
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as 
expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil 
action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, 
the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over 
all other claims that are so related to claims in the action 
within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the 
same case or controversy under Article III of the United 
States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall 
include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of 
additional parties. 104 
Jurisdiction is conferred in broad terms. Subsection (a) uses the "case 
or controversy" statement of the outer limits of federal jurisdiction 
found in Article III of the Constitution. 105 By using this outer 
constitutional limit, this subsection echoes the holding in Gibbs. 106 
Expressly overruling Finley,lC17 and "explicitly fill[ing] the statu-
tory gap noted" in that case,IOS "[t]he second sentence of subsection 
(a) make[s] explicit the federal courts' authority to hear supplemental 
claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional par-
ties." 109 The drafters of the statute noted that this sentence also, in 
part, reinstates prior settled law. IIO For example, "impleader claims 
against non-diverse third-party defendants are authorized [by § 
1367(a)], as are compulsory counterclaims and crossclaims involving 
additional parties." III Most importantly, through the last sentence of 
section 1367(a), Congress authorized pendent party jurisdiction, with 
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Supp. 1991). 
105. See Siegel, supra note 4, at 221; see also H.R. REP. No. 734, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 6873-74. 
106. H.R. REp. No. 734, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6874 n.15; see Thomas M. Mengler 
et aI., Congress Accepts Supreme Court's Invitation to Codify Supplemental 
Jurisdiction, 74 JUDICATURE 213, 215 (1991) ("Typically, courts have under-
stood the same constitutional case or controversy to include all claims arising 
out of a single transaction or occurrence or related series of transactions or 
occurrences.' '). 
107. Mengler et aI., supra note 106, at 215. 
108. H.R. REP. No. 734, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6874-75. 
109. Mengler et aI., supra note 106, at 215. 
110. H.R. REp. No. 734, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6874. 
Ill. Mengler et aI., supra note 106, at 215. 
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some exceptions in diversity cases, as provided in section 1367(b). 
By these terms, Congress has indicated that supplemental jurisdiction 
with regard to pendent claims is mandatory, subject only to a right 
of exclusion as a matter of judicial discretion under section 1367(c).112 
Since the passage of this statute, a number of courts have used 
section 1367(a) as a basis for allowing supplemental jurisdiction over 
claims.1IJ Section 1367(a) was recently applied in Rosen v. Chang.ll4 
112. Siegel, supra note 4, at 221. 
113. See Lewis v. United States, 812 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1993) (allowing 
supplemental jurisdiction over a pendent party's general maritime claims in an 
admiralty suit against the United States); In re Storage Technology Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 804 F. Supp. 1368, 1375 (D. Colo. 1992) (allowing supplemental juris-
diction over plaintiff's state law fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims 
because they were based on the same facts supporting the plaintiff's federal 
securities claims and formed part of the same case or controversy); United 
States v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 795 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (allowing 
supplemental jurisdiction of common law claims because they were based on 
a single set of operative facts and formed part of the same case or controversy 
as plaintiff's Federal False Claims Act claims); Roe v. Little Co. of Mary 
Hosp., 800 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (allowing supplemental jurisdiction 
over state negligence claims against non-diverse parties arising out of delivery 
of contaminated blood); United States ex rei. Chicago Bldg. Restoration, Inc. 
v. Tazzioli Constr. Co., 796 F. Supp. 1130 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (allowing the 
plaintiff to bring a claim, in addition to its "Miller Action" claim, against a 
subcontractor and its surety under supplemental jurisdiction since both claims 
arose out of the same work); Freiburger v. Emery Air Charter, Inc., 795 F. 
Supp. 253 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (allowing supplemental jurisdiction over breach of 
contract claim, but denying supplemental jurisdiction over claims of defamation 
and retaliatory discharge because they did not derive from common operative 
facts under the federal question claim); Leith v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 
793 F. Supp. 808 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (allowing supplemental jurisdiction over the 
personal injury action of an individual airline employee because this action 
was pendent to the airline's suit; the complaints, answers and affirmative 
defenses were the same; and most of the evidence would apply to both claims); 
Estate of Bruce v. City of Middletown, 781 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) 
(applying supplemental jurisdiction to a third-party complaint filed by the city 
against a movie theater for contribution, after the estate of the decedent filed 
an action against the city). 
Some courts, however, have overlooked the existence of the new section 
1367. An unpublished opinion by the United States District Court for the 
District of Maryland, Fisher v. United States R.R. Retirement Bd., Civil Nos. 
H-91-909 and H-91-1105 (D. Md. Oct. 2, 1991) presents such a situation. 
Plaintiffs, George and Frances Fisher, filed a complaint against the defendants, 
the United States Railroad Retirement Board ("USRRB") and the United 
States. In a separate civil action, Stanley Fisher filed a complaint against the 
defendants, the USRRB, the United States and George Fisher. The court 
consolidated the suits. 
Each complaint alleged that an automobile operated by George Fisher was 
involved in a collision with a vehicle which was negligently driven by an 
employee of the USRRB acting within the scope of his employment. At the 
time of the accident, Stanley Fisher was a passenger in the car driven by 
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In Rosen, "a civil rights suit was brought against various prison 
authorities on behalf of a deceased inmate." lIS The claim was prem-
ised on the "allegation that repeated complaints of abdominal pain 
were improperly diagnosed as an upset stomach and treated with 
Metamucil, when in fact the decedent was suffering from acute 
appendicitis, which ultimately caused his death." 116 The plaintiff 
asserted three claims: Count I was a claim against the named defen-
dants in their individual and official capacities as employees of the 
State of Rhode Island pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress alleged 
deprivations of rights secured by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution; Count II sought recovery 
against all defendants, except the State, pursuant to the Rhode Island 
Wrongful Death Act; and Count III asserted that the State was liable 
for the wrongful conduct of its employees under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior .117 
With regard to Count II, the court reviewed the standard an-
nounced in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs - that pendent jurisdic-
tion exists whenever (1) there is a federal claim arising under the 
grounds set out in Article III, section 2 of the Constitution; (2) the 
George Fisher. George Fisher and Stanley Fisher were seriously injured in the 
accident. Frances Fisher, the wife of George Fisher, sought recovery for harm 
to her marital relationship caused by the employee's alleged negligence. Both 
of these suits were filed under the Federal Torts Claim Act ("FTCA"). George, 
Frances and Stanley Fisher were all Maryland residents. After the court ordered 
the cases consolidated, the United States made a motion to dismiss the USRRB 
from the case, contending that it was not a proper party because the FTCA 
authorizes actions only against the United States and not against any of its 
agencies. The government further asserted that the court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over the claim asserted by Stanley Fisher against George Fisher. 
In an opinion authored by Senior United States District Judge Harvey, 
the court conduded that the government's motion to dismiss the claims against 
the USRRB and George Fisher would be granted. With regard to defendant 
George Fisher, the court, citing Finley, stated that the Supreme Court rejected 
the notion of pendent-party jurisdiction in a case brought under the FTCA 
and, accordingly, held that a plaintiff in an FTCA suit cannot proceed against 
non-federal defendants for whom no independent ground of jurisdiction exists. 
The court then held that "Finley clearly applies here and mandates dismissal 
of George Fisher as a defendant in the joined action, inasmuch as it is 
undisputed that the claim against him is not supported by an independent basis 
of federal jurisdiction." 
Neither the court nor counsel in their briefs acknowledged the existence 
of section 1367. The statute, however, clearly applied since this case was filed 
after December 1, 1990 and involved the type of situation covered by subsection 
(a). 
114. 758 F. Supp. 799 (D.R.I. 1991). 
115. [d. 
116. [d. at 801. 
117. [d. at 800-01. 
1992] Supplemental Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 81 
federal and state claims taken together comprise one constitutional 
"case;" and (3) the state and federal claims derive from a common 
nucleus of operatfve fact. lIs The Rosen court then recognized that 
this standard had been codified in section 1367. 119 Further, the court 
noted "that the operative facts underlying the wrongful death claim 
[were] the same facts underlying the [section] 1983 claim and that 
the claims [were], therefore, part of the same 'case or contro-
versy. ", 120 The court then concluded that it had the power to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the wrongful death claim.121 
With regard to Count III, the court acknowledged that the 
precedents of Aldinger v. Howardl22 and Clark v. Taylorlll did not 
preclude the court from hearing Count III in light of the recent 
passage of section 1367.124 The court stated that "the statute explicitly 
grants the courts the power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and 
states that '[s]uch supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that 
involve the joinder or intervention claims of additional parties."'12s 
The Rosen court found that because of the new statute's passage, 
the court now had the power to assert jurisdiction over the respondeat 
superior claim against the State. l26 The court held that this state law 
claim was part of the same case or controversy as the federal section 
1983 claim because the respondeat superior "case against the State 
[would] be based almost entirely on the proof used against the 
individual defendants. "127 The court also concluded "that it would 
serve the interests of judicial economy to try these related claims 
together. "128 
Another case employing section 1367(a) is Godfrey v. Perkin-
Elmer Corporation. 129 In Godfrey, a "[f]emale employee brought a 
Title VII action against her employer and three of its employees and 
asserted state law claims for wrongful discharge, intentional and 
negligent infliction. of emotional distress, and slander. "130 The em-
ployee's husband presented a derivative claim for loss of consor-
tium. 131 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the state claims for 
118. [d. at 802 (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966». 
119. [d. at 802. 
120. [d. at 803. 
121. [d. 
122. 427 U.S. 1 (1976). 
123. 710 F .2d 4 (1st Cir. 1983). 
124. Rosen v. Chang, 758 F. Supp. 799, 803 (D.R.I. 1991). 
125. [d. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a». 
126. [d. 
127. [d. at 803-04. 
128. [d. at 804 .. 
129. 794 F. Supp. 1179 (D.N.H. 1992). 
130. [d. 
131. [d. at 1181-82. 
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lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 132 The court denied this motion, 
holding that it had supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state 
claims since these claims were "all based upon the same alleged 
discriminatory acts" as the sexual harassment claim which provided 
the basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. 133 
While acknowledging the parties' debate as to whether a federal 
court "can or should exercise pendent jurisdiction over state law 
claims in the context of a Title VII action," the court found that 
this question was now resolved through the supplemental jurisdiction 
provisions of section 1367(a).134 The court decided that the "plaintiff's 
claims pass[ed] muster" under the Gibbs standard, which had been 
incorporated into section 1367(a).13S According to the court, the 
plaintiff's sexual harassment claim under Title VII provided the basis 
for federal subject matter jurisdiction, and the plaintiff's federal and 
state claims were all based upon the same alleged discriminatory 
acts,136 The court then stated that "given the duplication and waste 
of judicial resources that separate trials would entail, [the] plaintiff 
would be expected to try them all in a single proceeding. "137 Ac-
cordingly, the court held "that it had the power to exercise supple-
mental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law claims, subject only 
to the narrow circumstances detailed by Congress [in section 
1367(c)]."138 Indeed, the court, citing Cedillo v. Valcar Enterprises 
& Darling Delaware CO.139 with approval, stated that "[i]f the claim 
is within the court's supplemental discretion, the court must exercise 
such jurisdiction unless one of the four categorical exceptions in 
[section] 1367(c) is satisfied." 140 
The Godfrey court found no reason to decline supplemental 
jurisdiction under any of the grounds noted in section 1367(c). Since 
the Title VII claim had not been dismissed, section 1367(c)(3) did 
not apply,l41 The "plaintiff's state claims [did] not present any novel 
or complex issues of state law[,]" nor did they predominate over the 
Title VII claims.142 In addition, "there [was] no comprehensive plan 
132. Id. at 1183. 
133. [d. at 1184. 
134. [d. at 1183-84. Since the parties framed their arguments in terms of whether 
"pendent" jurisdiction should apply, they were apparently unaware of section 





139. 773 F. Supp. 932 (N.D. Tex. 1991). 
140. Godfrey, 794 F. Supp. at 1184 (quoting Cedillo v. Valcar Enter. & Darling 
Delaware Co., 773 F. Supp. 932, 939 (N.D. Tex. 1991» (emphasis added). 
141. Id. at 1184. 
142. [d. at 1185. 
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of state regulation at issue[;]"143 therefore, the court concluded that 
sections 1367(c)(1) and (c)(2) did not apply.l44 
Finally, the Godfrey court addressed the claims of the employee's 
husband's derivative claim for loss of consortium. 145 This claim 
rendered the husband a pendent party plaintiff. l46 The court noted 
that prior to the passage of section 1367, the debate existed as to 
whether the husband's claim could be joined under Finley.147 After 
the passage of section 1367(a), pendent party jurisdiction would be 
allowed; and therefore, the husband could be joined. l48 
Section 1367(a), as applied by the courts, has facilitated a 
litigant's desire for a unified action in federal court where the 
constitutional jurisdictional requisites have been met. Corporate Re-
sources, Inc. v. Southeast Suburban Ambulatory Surgical Center, 
Inc.,149 however, exemplifies a situation where the court, attempting 
to follow section 1367, has produced a result that clearly exceeds 
Congress' intent when it enacted the statute. In Corporate Resources, 
the plaintiff, Corporate Resources, Inc. ("C.R.I.") was a Michigan 
corporation having its principal place of business in Michigan. lso 
C.R.I. 's business consisted of providing financing for leased equip-
ment. 151 The defendant, Southeast Suburban Ambulatory Surgical 
Center ("Southeast") was an Illinois corporation, having its principal 
place of business in Illinois .152 Southeast was in the business of 
providing medical care. 153 The defendants, eight individually named 
physicians, were citizens and residents of Illinois. lS4 Southeast con-
tracted with C.R.1. to lease medical and other types of equipment.1SS 
Pursuant to this agreement, the parties entered into three separate 
lease orders between January 5, 1989, and May 25, 1989.156 Each 
defendant made a "written personal guarant[y] to C.R.1. on behalf 
of Southeast."1S7 The defendants promised C.R.I. "the prompt pay-
ment in full, when due, or accelerated following default, of every 
Lease Payment due under the Lease Agreement or any Lease Order" 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 1184-85. 




149. 774 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. III. 1991). 
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entered into by Southeast}S8 In its suit, C.R.1. alleged that in 
November 1990, Southeast c~sed making its monthly payments}S9 
In Count I of its complaint: '-C.R.1. sued Southeast for breach of 
contract in the amount of $243~429.69; in Count II, C.R.1. sought 
$174,398.80 for lease payments after it exercised the acceleration 
clause}60 Counts III through X were directed against each of the 
eight individual physicians. 161 These counts requested amounts ranging 
from $21,908.66 to $243,429.60, with five of the counts being less 
than $50,000. 162 The plaintiff argued that each of the counts in its 
ten-cOunt complaint arose under the court's diversity jurisdiction. 163 
The five individual defendants who were being sued for less than 
$50,000 moved for dismissal of the counts against them because these 
amounts did not meet the statutory amount in controversy require-
ment for a diversity case. l64 
The court agreed that it had diversity jurisdiction over the 
plaintiff's claim against Southeast, but recognized that with regard 
to the individual physician defendants, "if a single plaintiff asserts 
claims against more than one defendant and each defendant's liability 
is several on the respective claims, jurisdiction attaches only to those 
claims which individually involve matters exceeding the jurisdictional 
amount. "165 Thus, the court determined that the claims against the 
physicians lacked independent subject matter jurisdiction, and there-
fore, that the physicians were pendent parties to the plaintiff's claim 
against Southeast. 166 The court then had to decide if it could "exercise 
'pendent party jurisdiction' over the claims against the physicians."167 
The court began its analysis by recognizing that "Congress ... 
overrode the Aldinger and Finley decisions [which rejected the doc-
trine of pendent party jurisdiction) when it passed the Judicial 
Improvement Act of 1990."168 The court next quoted the provisions 
of section 1367(a), erroneously identifying it as section 1367(b).l69 
Relying on section 1367(a), the court concluded that "it may, con-
sistent with Article III of the Constitution, exercise jurisdiction over 
158. [d. 
159. [d. 
160. [d. at 504-05. 




165. [d. (citing Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Simpson, 404 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1968». 




1992] Supplemental Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 85 
all the individual defendants." 170 The court reasoned . that its exercise 
of supplemental (pendent party) jurisdiction with respect to all of 
the counts against the individual defendants is in the interests of 
judicial economy; because all the counts in this action "derive from 
a common nucleus of operative facts" and are such that a plaintiff 
would "ordinarily be expected to try them in one judicial proceed-
ing. "171 . 
This action was brought as a diversity action by the plaintiff. 
Because the defendant physicians were alleged to be severally liable 
on the respective claims, they could be joined as parties to the action 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 20. Thus, the correct section for the court to 
rely on was section 1367(b). By analyzing the case under section 
1367(a), the court accepted jurisdiction over the five physicians who 
were each being sued for less than $50,000. Thus, the court allowed 
the plaintiff to join parties over which a federal court would not 
have had jurisdiction if they had been sued separately, since plaintiff's 
claims against them did not meet the amount in controversy require-
ment. As the court correctly stated, section 1367(a) was enacted to 
overrule Finley. However, Finley involved pendent party jurisdiction 
where the original action was based on federal question jurisdiction, 
over which the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction, and the 
plaintiff wished to join related state parties in claims over which the 
court had no independent federal subject matter jurisdiction. The 
legislative history of the statute states that "[i]n federal question 
cases, [the statute] broadly authorizes the district courts to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over additional claims including claims 
involving the joinder of additional parties."172 In diversity cases, 
however, "the district courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction, 
except when doing so would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional 
requirements of the diversity statute."173 
Corporate Resources does not present Finley concerns because 
it did not involve a federal question that could only be litigated in 
federal court. Yet, in a case founded on diversity, the court permitted 
the plaintiff to avoid a requirement of the diversity statute, contrary 
to the stated intent of Congress. Moore's Federal Practice states that 
"[a]ny remaining doubt as to the permissibility of exercising pendent 
party jurisdiction in diversity actions should be resolved by [section 
1367(b)]."174 "Because both complete diversity and the amount in 
170. [d. 
171. [d. (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966». 
172. H.R. Rep. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6873, 6874. 
173. [d. (emphasis added). 
174. 3A JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 20.07, at 88-89 (2d ed. 
1992). 
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controversy are 'jurisdictional requirements' under [section] 1332, 
neither can be evaded by an appeal to supplemental or pendent party 
jurisdiction."17s This interpretation is clearly borne out by the legis-
lative history of the statute. Evidently, the Corporate Resources court 
did not understand the proper application of the statute. 
B. Subsection (b) 
Subsection (b) of section 1367 applies in actions in which subject 
matter jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship under 
28 U.S.C. § 1332. Section 1367(b) provides as follows: 
In any civil action of which the district courts have original 
jurisdiction founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the 
district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under 
subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made 
parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to 
be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or 
seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such 
rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such 
claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional require-
ments of section 1332.176 
This subsection does not preclude courts from exercising supplemental 
jurisdiction in diversity cases in general, but merely mandates its 
preclusion in a number of specific instances. 177 Siegel asserts that the 
repetition of the word "plaintiffs" at several rule-citing junctures in 
subsection (b) makes clear that the subsection is "concerned only 
with efforts of a plaintiff to smuggle in claims that the plaintiff 
would not otherwise be able to interpose against certain parties in 
certain specific contexts for want of [diversity] jurisdiction. "178 
Diversity under section 1332 has been construed to require that 
each plaintiff differ in citizenship from each defendant. 179 This rule 
of "complete diversity" was announced in Strawbridge v. Curtis}SO 
Commentators have agreed that Congress intended that this complete 
diversity requirement remain intact after the passage of section 1367. IS1 
This notion is further strengthened by the concluding language of 
section 1367(b)-"when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such 
175. [d. 




180. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806); see also Siegel, supra note 4, at 222. 
181. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 4, at 222; Oakley, supra note 2 at 765. 
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claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of 
section 1332." 182 Similarly, in enacting subsection (b), Congress has, 
in effect, codified the principal rationale of Owen Equipment & 
Erection Co. v. Kroger. 183 Subsection (b) fully implements the Owen 
Equipment rationale by prohibiting the district courts, in actions 
founded solely on diversity, from exercising supplemental jurisdiction 
over claims asserted by plaintiffs against persons made parties through 
any of the several joinder devices of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure when doing so "would be inconsistent with the jurisdic-
tional requirements of section 1332."184 
While subsection (b) prohibits the exercise of supplemental ju-
risdiction in connection with the joinder or intervention of plaintiffs 
when it would be inconsistent with section 1332, class actions under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 are not included in the diversity cases to which 
the restrictions in subsection (b) apply.18S The legislative history 
clarifies that section 1367 was not intended to affect the jurisdictional 
requirements previously determined to apply to class actions. l86 "Thus, 
the Supreme Court's holdings that only the named class representa-
tives must satisfy the citizenship requirement of [section] 1332 but 
that all class members must satisfy the amount in controversy re-
quirements remains good decisional law."I87 It is unfortunate, how-
ever, that the drafters of the statute did not see fit to eXPressly lay 
out these rules within the statute itself. Professor Freer, one of the 
most outspoken critics of the statute, has stated with regard to this 
omission that "[e]vidently, we must hope that judges dealing with 
the statute have a copy of the legislative history." 188 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 14 is the procedural rule governing the third-
party practice of impleader. l89 This rule allows a defendant alleging 
182. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (Supp. 1991). 
183. 437 u.s. 365 (1978); see Mengler et al., supra note 106, at 215. 
184. Mengler et aI., supra note 106, at 215. 
185. [d. 
186. H.R. REp. No. 734, IOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6873, 6874; see also Mengler et al., supra note 106, at 215. 
187. Mengler et aI., supra note 106, at 215 (citing Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. 
Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 
(1973». 
188. Freer, Compounding Confusion, supra note 3, at 486. 
189. Rule 14 provides as follows: 
(a) When Defendant May Bring in Third Party. At any time after 
commencement of the action a defending party, as a third-party 
plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a 
person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to the third-
party plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the third-
party plaintiff. The third-party plaintiff need not obtain leave to make 
the service if the third-party plaintiff files the third-party complaint 
not later than 10 days after serving the original answer. Otherwise 
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. that a third-party is liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's 
claim against him to implead such a person as a third-party defen-
dant. Traditionally, the defendant's impleader claim against the third-
party defendant qualified for ancillary jurisdiction if either the orig-
inal parties were of diverse citizenship or the plaintiff's claim against 
the third-party plaintiff must obtain leave on motion upon notice to 
all parties to the action. The person served with the summons and 
third-party complaint, hereinafter called the third-party defendant, 
shall make any defenses to the third-party plaintiff's claim as provided 
in Rule 12 and his counterclaims against the third-party plaintiff and 
cross-claims against other third-party defendants as provided in Rule 
13. The third-party defendant may assert against the plaintiff any 
defenses which the third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's claim. 
The third-party defendant may also assert any claim against the 
plaintiff arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject 
matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff. The 
plaintiff may assert any claim against the third-party defendant arising 
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the 
plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff, and the third-party 
defendant thereupon shall assert any defenses as provided in Rule 12 
and any counterclaims and cross-claims as provided in Rule 13. Any 
party may move to strike the third-party claim, or for its severance 
or separate trial. A third-party defendant may proceed under this rule 
against any person not a party to the action who is or may be liable 
to the third-party defendant for all or part of the claim made in the 
action against the third-party defendant. The third-party complaint, 
if within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, may be in rem 
against a vessel, cargo, or other property subject to admiralty or 
maritime process in rem, in which case references in this rule to the 
summons include the warrant of arrest, and references to the third-
party plaintiff or defendant include, where appropriate, the claimant 
of the property arrested. 
(b) When Plaintiff May Bring in Third Party. 
When a counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff, the plaintiff may 
cause a third party to be brought in under circumstances which under 
this rule would entitle a defendant to do so. 
(c) Admiralty and Maritime Claims. 
When a plaintiff asserts an admiralty or maritime claim within the 
meaning of Rule 9(h), the defendant or claimant, as a third-party 
plaintiff, may bring in a third-party defendant who may be wholly or 
partly liable, either to the plaintiff or to the third-party plaintiff, by 
way of remedy over, contribution, or otherwise on account of the 
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. 
In such a case the third-party plaintiff may also demand judgment 
against the third-party defendant in favor of the plaintiff, in which 
event the third-party defendant shall make any defenses to the claim 
of the plaintiff as well as to that of the third-party plaintiff in the 
manner provided in Rule 12 and the action shall proceed as if the 
plaintiff had commenced it against the third-party defendant as well 
as the third-party plaintiff. 
FED. R. avo P. 14. 
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the original defendant raised a federal question; 190 section 1367 does 
not change this. Section 1367 does, however, exclude supplemental 
jurisdiction over any claim the plaintiff may assert against the third-
party defendant after the defendant impleads the third-party defen-
dant. 191 Procedurally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a) allows such a direct 
claim if the plaintiff can show that the court has subject matter 
. jurisdiction over this claim asserted against a third-party defendant. l92 
Indeed, the rules could not dispense with such a showing because 
Congress has barred the rule makers from disturbing the requirements 
of subject matter jurisdiction.193 However, the language of section 
1367(b) clarifies that supplemental jurisdiction will still not support 
this type of claim asserted by a plaintiff because it is inconsistent 
with section 1332.194 Section 1367 thereby adopts the Supreme Court's 
holding in Owen Equipment. 19S 
Professor Freer notes that both kinds of Rule 14(a) claims (i.e., 
a claim by a plaintiff against the third-party defendant, and a claim 
by a third-party defendant against the plaintiff) are permitted only 
if they "arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the under-
lying dispute," 196 thereby satisfying the constitutional test for sup-
plemental jurisdiction under Gibbs and section 1367(a).197 Freer notes 
that the Report of Federal Courts Study Committee and at least one 
draft of supplemental jurisdiction legislation called for overruling the 
Owen Equipment result, which allowed supplemental jurisdiction over 
a Rule 14(a) claim by a third-party defendant against a plaintiff, but 
did not allow a 14(a) claim by a plaintiff against a third-party 
defendant. 198 Freer is disturbed that the final statute chose to codify 
this "schizophrenic treatment of 14(a) claims."I99 Freer concedes that 
in order to codify established pre-Finley practice, it would be nec-
essary to codify the result that occurred in Owen Equipment.200 
190. See WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 4, at 515. 
191. Siegel, supra note 4, at 222. 
192. [d. 
193. [d. (citing FED. R. CIY. P. 82). Rule 82 provides: 
These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction 
of the United States district courts or the venue of actions therein. 
An admiralty or maritime claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h) shall 
not be treated as a civil action for the purposes of Title 28, U.S.C. 
§§ 1391-93. 
FED. R. CIY. P. 82. 
194. Siegel, supra note 4, at 222. 
195. [d. 
196. Freer, Compounding Confusion, supra note 3, at 475. 
197. [d. 
198. [d. at 475-76. 
199. [d. 
200. [d. 
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Nevertheless, Freer believes that the Owen Equipment result exem-
plifies an anti-diversity bias by the courts to limit or discourage 
claims brought into federal court, and that this bias was codified 
into section 1367.201 . 
Freer's criticism is valid only if the enactment of section 1367 
was intended to revive the entire area of diversity jurisdiction. The 
legislative history of the statute indicates, however, that Congress 
intended only to restore diversity practice prior to Finley. 202 Never-
theless, one can certainly argue that having undertaken to enter the 
field of supplemental jurisdiction legislatively via section 1367, Con-
gress should not have limited itself to simply restoring pre-Finley 
practice, but should have undertaken to address other issues, such 
as Owen Equipment's treatment of Rule 14(a) claims. 
As noted by Professor Mengler, "subsection (b), in prohibiting 
certain claims by a plaintiff, is silent regarding counterclaims by the 
plaintiff in reaction to the claims of joined parties against the 
plaintiff. "203 In the past, federal courts have held that ancillary 
jurisdiction may be properly asserted over compulsory counter-
claims.204 Freer illustrates a potential problem with the statute by 
describing a situation in which a third-party defendant files a Rule 
14(a) claim against a non-diverse plaintiff and the plaintiff asserts a 
transactionally related claim against the third-party defendant. 20s Be-
cause the third-party defendant and the plaintiff are now opposing 
parties, the claim by the plaintiff is a compulsory counterclaim with 
respect to the third party's Rule 14(a) claim.206 Freer notes that 
section 1367(b), as written, precludes supplemental jurisdiction over 
this compulsory counterclaim by the plaintiff. 207 
In response to Freer's argument, the drafters assert that the 
word "claims" in this provision does not encompass "counter-
claims," a subject on which the statute remains silent. 208 According 
to the drafters' argument, the courts are free to follow prior case 
law, authorizing supplemental jurisdiction over these claims.209 Freer, 
in addressing this argument, notes that "while courts ultimately may 
permit supplemental jurisdiction over such counterclaims [as was the 
201. [d. 
202. H.R. REP. No. 734, WIst Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6873,6874. 
203. Mengler et aI., supra note 106, at 215 n.17. 
204. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 375 n.18 (1978) 
(citing Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926». 
205. Freer, Compounding ConfUSion, supra note 3, at 481. 
206. [d. 
207. [d. Section 1367(b) precludes supplemental jurisdiction "over claims by plain-
tiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14." [d. 
208. [d. (citing Mengler et aI., supra note 106, at 215 n.l7). 
209. [d. 
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accepted prior' practice], the statute does not compel them to do 
SO."210 Arguably, an express provision of this rule in the statute 
would better guide the courts. 
A related problem arises in determining whether the plaintiff 
can implead a non-diverse third party or assert a cross-claim against 
a non-diverse co-plaintiff in response to a counterclaim. Freer notes 
that in these situations, "under prior practice, either claim by the 
plaintiffs would seem to invoke supplemental jurisdiction. "211 The 
language of section 1367(b), however, would preclude supplemental 
jurisdiction over these claims because both impleader claims and 
cross-claims in this type of situation would be "claims by plain-
tiffs. "212 The impleader claim would be a claim against a party joined 
under Rule 14 and the cross-claim would be a claim against a party 
joined under Rule 20.2I3 Both claims, therefore, fall within the 
prohibition of supplemental jurisdiction in 1367(b).214 The result of 
this prohibition "would force the plaintiff to litigate her claims for 
indemnity or contribution in a state court while the underlying claim 
and counterclaim would proceed in federal court. "21S This situation 
would open the plaintiff to precisely the kind of prejudice that the 
joinder rules attempted to avoid.216 
Freer asserts that courts can avoid these ridiculous results only 
through "creative interpretation," and suggests that the most logical 
interpretation for the courts to adopt would be that plaintiffs against 
whom a counterclaim has been filed would no longer be considered 
"plaintiffs," but rather would be classified as "defendants. "217 If 
this position is adopted, Freer questions how far the courts will be 
required to go in this creative reinterpretation of the parties. Will 
courts reclassify defendants who assert counterclaims, cross-claims 
or impleader claims as plaintiffs?218 Freer notes that if the courts 
take this route, then supplemental jurisdiction risks being destroyed. 219 
If a defendant asserting a counterclaim, cross-claim or impleader 
210. [d. at 481-82. Professor Freer notes that this same problem arises when the 
defendant in a diversity case files a counterclaim against the plaintiff and the 
plaintiff seeks to assert a . cross-claim against a non-diverse co-party who owes 
the plaintiff an indemnity or contribution for the counterclaim. [d. In this 
case, the cross-claim is a claim by a plaintiff against a party joined under Rule 
20, also falling within the confines of section 1367(b). 
211. [d. at 463 n.103, 482. 





217. [d. at 483. 
218. [d. 
219. [d. at 483-84. 
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claim is a "plaintiff for purposes of affirmative claims, then her 
counterclaims, cross-claims and impleader claims cannot invoke sup-
plemental jurisdiction because, under section 1367(b)[,] they are 
claims by a plaintiff against a party joined under Rules 14 and 20."220 
Freer's analysis reflects a lack of appreciation as to why plaintiffs 
and defendants are treated differently for purposes of supplemental 
jurisdiction. As the Court in Owen Equipment emphasized, "[i]t is 
a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited 
jurisdiction. "221 These limits, "whether imposed by the Constitution 
or by Congress, must be neither disregarded nor evaded."222 Situa-
tions will exist where all of a plaintiff's claims cannot be tried 
together in a federal forum because some of the claims do not fall 
within the necessary constitutional and/or statutory confines.223 The 
Owen Equipment Court noted that in determining whether jurisdic-
tion over a non federal claim exists, a court must examine the context 
in which the nonfederal claim is asserted.224 A plaintiff voluntarily 
bringing a state law claim into federal court is quite different from 
those claims of "a defending party [who is] haled into court against 
his will," or of "another person whose rights might be irretrievably 
lost unless he could assert them in an ongoing action in federal 
court. "225 Thus, a plaintiff who voluntarily brings a state law claim 
in a federal court "cannot complain if [supplemental] jurisdiction 
does not encompass all of his possible claims in one case, since it is 
he who has chosen the federal rather than the state forum and must 
thus accept its limitations!'226 
Additional joinder situations arise under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, 
compulsory joinder, Fed. R. Civ. P. 20, permissive joinder, and Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 24, intervention-three rules specifically cited in section 
1367(b). Subsection (b) generally denies the use of supplemental 
jurisdiction to a plaintiff when the plaintiff seeks to assert a claim 
against a person joined under those rules where no independent 
subject matter jurisdiction exists for these claims.227 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19228 describes two types of parties that may be 
joined. Rule 19(a) concerns "necessary" parties.229 Necessary parties 
220. Id. at 484. 
221. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978). The federal 




224. Id. at 375-76. 
225. Id. at 376. 
226. Id. 
227. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (Supp. 1991). 
228. Rule 19 provides: 
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are those parties who have an interest in the controversy and who, 
in the interest of complete justice, should be joined.230 Rule 19(b) 
deals with "indispensable" parties.231 Indispensable parties are those 
parties that "not only have an interest in the controversy, but [this] 
interest is of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without 
either affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy in such a 
(a) Persons To Be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to 
service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a 
party in the action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot 
be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an 
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that 
the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a 
practical matter impair or impede the persc,>n's ability to protect that 
interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a 
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If the person has not 
been so joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party. 
If the person should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, the 
person may be made a defendant, or in a proper case, an involuntary 
plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and joinder of that 
party would render the venue of the action improper, that party shall 
be dismissed from the action. 
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. If a 
person as described in subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a 
party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience 
the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be 
dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The 
factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a 
judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to the 
person or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by 
protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or 
other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, 
whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; 
fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the 
action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 
(c) Pleading Reasons for Nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim 
for relief shall state the names, if known to the pleader, of any 
persons as described in subdivision (a)(I)-(2) hereof who are not joined, 
and the reasons why they are not joined. 
(d) Exception of Class Actions. This rule is subject to the provisions 
of Rule 23. 
FED. R. Crv. P. 19. 
229. See generally 3A MOORE, supra note 174, 1 19.01. "Necessary party" termi-
nology was developed in the case of Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 
158, 160 (1854), which occurred prior to the 1966 revision of the law, and still 
provides a useful means of interpreting present Rule 19. See also Provident 
Tradesmen's Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968). 
230. See 3A MOORE, supra note 174, 1 19.01, at 17 (citing Shields v. Barrow, 58 
U.S. (17 How.) 130, 139 (1854». 
231. See ide 1 19.01, at 17 n.I94. 
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condition that its final termination may be wholly inconsistent with 
equity and good conscience." 232 Rule 19(b) indispensable parties are 
so vital to the action that if their joinder is impossible, the whole 
action must be dismissed.233 Under decisions issued prior to the 
enactment of section 1367, if the joinder of a party found to be a 
necessary defendant under Rule 19 was inconsistent with the juris-
dictional requirements of section 1332, the party could not be joined 
on the basis of pendent or ancillary jurisdiction.234 Under section 
1367, however, a person found to be a necessary defendant under 
Rule 19 may theoretically be joined under supplemental jurisdiction, 
but the plaintiff may not assert a claim against that person unless 
the requisite diversity requirements are satisfied.23S 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24236 provides for two kinds of intervention: 
intervention as a matter of right, Rule 24(a) , and permissive inter-
vention, Rule 24(b). Under Rule 24(a), a party shall be permitted to 
intervene in an action if a federal statute confers an unconditional 
right to intervene, or if the party claims an interest relating to the 
property or transaction, which is the subject of the action, and is so 
situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede his 
ability to protect his interest. 237 Under Rule 24(b) , a party may be 
232. See id. , 19.01, at 17 n.195. 
233. See generally FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 5, § 6.5, at 334-35; see also 
Haas v. Jefferson Nat'l Bank, 442 F.2d 394, 395 (5th Cir. 1971). 
234. Mengler et al., supra note 106, at 215 n.23. 
235. [d. 
236. RULE 24 provides: 
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be. 
permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United 
States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the 
applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction 
which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that 
the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or 
impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the 
applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties. 
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be 
permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United 
States confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an appli-
cant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law 
or fact in common. When a party to an action relies for ground of 
claim or defense upon any statute or executive order administered by 
a federal or state governmental officer or agency or upon any regu-
lation, order, requirement or agreement issued or made pursuant to 
the statute or executive order, the officer or agency upon timely 
application may be permitted to intervene in the action. In exercising 
its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will 
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original 
parties. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 24. 
237. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a) (emphasis added). 
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permitted to intervene if a federal statute confers a conditional right 
to intervene or if a party's claim or defense and the main action 
have a question of law or fact in common.238 It has been generally 
understood that the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction would not apply 
to the permissive intervention claim of Rule 24(b); however, a general 
consensus exists in the federal courts that the doctrine would apply 
to the intervention-of-right claim meeting the requirements of sub-
division (a).239 
From the language of section 1367(b), one can infer that Con-
gress never intended supplemental jurisdiction to be applied to inter-
vention situations to support a claim on the plaintiff's side.240 Siegel 
notes that "[t]he second reference to Rule 24 in subdivision (b) of 
[section] 1367 makes it explicit that one seeking to intervene as a 
plaintiff under Rule 24 is not to be given supplemental jurisdiction 
of the claim the intervenor proposes to plead. "241 Further, the "earlier 
reference to Rule 24 precludes supplemental jurisdiction from helping 
a claim by the original plaintiff against a person .who has intervened 
under Rule 24."242 Nevertheless, if a party, meeting the requirements' 
of Rule 24, intervenes as a defendant and interposes a counterclaim 
against the plaintiff, over which an original federal jurisdictional 
basis exists, then section 1367(b) does not appear to prohibit a court 
from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over this claim.243 
Professors Mengler, Burbank, and Rowe, who participated in 
the drafting of the legislation that codified supplemental jurisdiction, 
note that "[a] person can neither intervene as a plaintiff under Rule 
24(a) nor be joined as a plaintiff under Rule 19 if intervention or 
joinder would be inconsistent with diversity requirements. "244 There-
fore, they contend that "courts should not only deny intervention 
or joinder [in these circumstances], but also consider dismissing the 
entire action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 when significant interests 
would be prejudiced by the absentee's exclusion from the action."24s 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 is the procedural rule governing permissive 
joinder.246 Rule 20 allows a plaintiff to join other plaintiffs or to 
238. FED. R. CIY. P. 24(b) (emphasis added). 
239. Siegel, supra note 4, at 221. 
240. Id. at 223. 
241. Id. 
242. Id.; see also Freer, Compounding Confusion, supra note 3, at 476-78. 
243. Siegel, supra note 4, at 221. 
244. Mengler et ai., supra note 106, at 215. 
245. Id. 
246. Rule 20 provides: 
(a) Permissive 10inder.·All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs 
if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative 
in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or 
series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or 
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make several parties co-defendants to a claim, if all claims asserted 
in the lawsuit are joint, several or arising out of the same transaction 
or series of transactions and there exists any question of law or fact 
common to all c1aims.247 While the "provisions of Rule 20 governing 
permissive joinder of parties should be construed liberally to promote 
trial convenience and avoid multiple lawsuits," jurisdictional and 
venue requirements are serious limitations upon permissive joinder. 248 
All parties, whether plaintiffs or defendants, joined under Rule 20 
must meet federal subject matter jurisdictional requirements249 be-
cause ancillary jurisdiction does not apply to Rule 20 joinder. 250 If 
the action is brought as a diversity action, "each plaintiff must be 
of diverse citizenship to each defendant."251 However, Thomas Arthur 
and Professor Freer note that section 1367(b) does not codify this 
complete diversity rule by precluding supplemental jurisdiction over 
claims made by a non-diverse plaintiff subsequently joined under 
Rule 20.252 Surely this omission was not intended to overrule the 
prior requirement of complete diversity in this situation; however, 
the statutory language was not clearly drafted, thereby providing 
little guidance. 
Professor Siegel suggests that the "last clause of [section 1367(b)] 
may offer the courts some leeway in avoiding an overly rigid con-
struction of the subdivision.' '253 As applied to a situation where a 
fact common to all these persons will arise in the action. All persons 
(and any vessel, cargo or other property subject to admiralty process 
in rem) may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted 
against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief 
in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or 
series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or 
fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. A plaintiff or 
defendant need not be interested in obtaining or defending against all 
the relief demanded. Judgment may be given for one or more of the 
plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief, and against one 
or more defendants according to their respective liabilities. 
(b) Separate Trials. The court may make such orders as will prevent 
a party from being embarrassed, delayed, or put to expense by the 
inclusion of a party against whom the party asserts no claim and who 
asserts no claim against the party, and may order separate trials or 
make other orders to prevent delay or prejudice. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 20. 
247. See id. 
248. See 3A MOORE, supra note 174, 1 20.05, at 22-23. 
249. [d. 1 20.07, at 40. 
250. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 5, § 2.14, at 78. 
251. See 3A MOORE, supra note 174, 1 20.07, at 41 & n.9 (citing Strawbridge v. 
Curtiss, 7 U.S. (7 Dall.) 267 (1806». 
252. Arthur & Freer, Burnt Straws, supra note 3, at 982. 
253. Siegel, supra note 4, at 223. 
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non-diverse plaintiff is joined under Rule 20, Siegel emphasizes that 
the exclusion of supplemental jurisdiction in this case only applies if 
the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction would be inc·onsistent with 
the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.254 Siegel states that 
"if the situation is one in which the court can be convinced that the 
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction would not undermine the com-
plete diversity requirement of section 1332," and that exercising 
jurisdiction would expedite the case's disposition without substantially 
increasing the work load, "the final clause of subdivision (b) should 
afford the court a tool with which to sustain supplemental jurisdiction 
of the added claim. "255 For example, Siegel asserts that supplemental 
jurisdiction should be exercised where a court clearly has jurisdiction 
over the claims already pending before the court and these claims 
"would have to remain for adjudication even if the added claim 
should be rejected. "256 If Siegel's interpretation is accurate, then the 
statute represents a more liberal approach to supplemental jurisdiction 
than the Owen Equipment and Aldinger decisions, which emphasized 
the . limited nature of federal jurisdiction. 
Few courts have discussed section 1367(b).257 Recent cases, how-
ever, involving subsection (b) include C.D.S. Diversified v. Franchise 
Finance Corp.258 and Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Manuel. 259 In C.D.S. 
Diversified, the plaintiff, C.D.S., was a New York corporation having 
its principal place of business in New York. 260 One defendant, Ticor 
Title Insurance Company ("Ticor"), was organized under the laws 
of California, and maintained its principal place of business in 





257. While of limited precedential value, a number of unpublished cases have relied 
upon section 1367(b) to defeat the application of supplemental jurisdiction. 
See, e.g., Atheron v. Casey, No. 92-1283, 1992 WL 235894 (E.D. La. Sept. 
4, 1992) (denying supplemental jurisdiction over a Rule 24(a)(2) intervention 
plaintiff because it would destroy complete diversity); Bradbury v. Robertson-
Ceco Corp., No. 92-3408, 1992 WL 178648 (N.D. Ill. July 22, 1992) (denying 
supplemental jurisdiction in a diversity case over claims asserted by plaintiffs 
that did not meet the requisite amount in controversy requirement); Pellegino 
v. Pesch, No. 91-C-4967, 1992 WL 159169 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 1992) (denying 
supplemental jurisdiction over parties that did not meet the requisite amount-
in-controversy requirement); Blum v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., No. 
9O-2428-R, 1991 WL 50258 (D. Kan. March 5, 1991) (denying supplemental 
jurisdiction over claims because complete diversity of the parties was lacking). 
258. 757 F. Supp. 202 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). 
259. 930 F.2d 573 (7th Cir. 1991). 
260. C.D.S. Diversified, 757 F. Supp. at 203. 
261. [d. 
262. [d. 
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In 1987, C.D.S. entered into a sale/leaseback agreement with 
another defendant, FFCA/IIP 1985 Property Company, in connec-
tion with property where a Burger King restaurant was operated.263 
"The agreement provided that FFCA was to purchase all real prop-
erty and equipment and, in turn, lease it back to C.D.S. for a period 
of eight to twenty years. "264 As a condition of entering into this 
agreement, C.D.S. was required to obtain a rent insurance policy 
with United Guaranty Insurance Company ("United Guaranty").265 
"Ticor acted as the title insurer as well as escrow agent for the sale-
leaseback transaction."266 
After C.D.S. failed to make its monthly rental payment to 
FFCA,267 FFCA terminated the lease for nonpayment.268 C.D.S. then 
sued FFCA, Ticor and United Guaranty, stating seven causes of 
action, including wrongful termination of the lease, conversion, fraud 
and breach of contract.269 The plaintiff's sole claim against Ticor 
alleged that Ticor had converted $36,000, which had been held in 
escrow for the plaintiff, by conspiring with FFCA.270 Pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(I), defendant Ticor moved to dismiss the claim 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, since the amount in contro-
versy did not exceed the required jurisdictional amount of $50,000.271 
C.D.S. requested the court to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the 
. claim against Ticor. 272 
Since this action was filed in August, 1989, the court correctly 
held that section 1367 was not applicable. 273 Nevertheless, the court 
noted that even if the statute had been binding, it would still have 
barred the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the claim against 
Ticor because this claim did not independently meet the amount in 
controversy requirement.274 In reaching this conclusion, the court 
noted that "with regard to pendent jurisdiction in diversity cases as 
opposed to 'federal question' cases, the legislature simply codified 
and made clear existing case law. "275 The court then cited Zahn v. 











273. [d. at 205. 
274. [d. at 205-06. 
275. [d. at 205. 
276. 414 u.s. 291 (1973). 
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Kroger277 to support the proposition that pendent party jurisdiction 
is not viable "where the amount in controversy is below the required 
jurisdictional amount or where diversity of citizenship is absent.' '278 
Thus, the C.D.S. Diversified court had little difficulty in correctly 
interpreting the provisions of section 1367(b), unlike the court in 
Corporate Resources, Inc. v. Southeast Suburban Ambulatory Sur-
gical Center, Inc., 279 which reached a contrary conclusion by erro-
neously interpreting a similar situation under section 1367(a). 
The Seventh Circuit also considered the application of section 
1367(b) in Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Manuel.280 In Unique Concepts, 
the defendant, Manuel, quit his employment at Unique Concepts and 
started his own firm.281 "Unique Concepts believed that Manuel's 
new business was producing products for which it held a patent, and 
it filed suit under the patent laws. "282 Manuel "responded with a 
counterclaim based on the state law of defamation and a state 
consumer protection" statute, because Unique Concepts had sent a 
letter to Manuel's customers stating that his products were unsafe 
and mentioning the pending patent litigation. 283 "These counterclaims 
were permissive rather than compulsory, because they arose out of 
different transactions" than did the original claims asserted by Unique 
Concepts against Manuel. 284 Diversity of citizenship supplied an in-
dependent jurisdictional basis for these counterclaims. 285 
The district" court bifurcated the case, trying the state consumer 
protection claims first.286 The jury returned a verdict of $200,000 in 
Manuel's favor. 287 "Unique Concepts then asked for leave to dismiss 
its claims without prejudice, a maneuver designed to avoid the 
possibility of preclusion in a contributory infringement suit Unique 
Concepts [had] pending in New York against Manuel's supplier."288 
The district court granted Unique Concept's motion on the condition 
that it execute a covenant not to refile the patent suit against 
ManueL289 The district court then entered a final judgment affecting 
all claims and counterclaims.290 
277. 437 u.s. 365 (1978). 
278. Id. at 205-06. " 
279. 774 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
280. 930 F.2d 573 (7th Cir. 1991). 
281. Id. 
282. Id. 
283. Id. at 574. 
284. Id. See also FED. R. CIY. P. 13(a). 
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Eventually, the case reached the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the case 
properly belonged in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
and ordered it transferred to that court.291 As a result, the Seventh 
Circuit did not decide any of the substantive issues. Nevertheless, 
the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that a federal court has supple-
mental jurisdiction (formerly ancillary jurisdiction) over compulsory 
counterclaims, but that permissive counterclaims require their own 
jurisdictional basis. 292 
Contrary to the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York and the Seventh Circuit, the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York appears to 
have misconstrued section 1367(b) in ZB Holdings, Inc. v. White. 293 
ZB Holdings was a stockholders' derivative suit. In 1989, a stock 
purchase transaction took place in which the defendant, BBA Group 
PLC ("BBA") acquired an eighty percent interest in IGH, Inc. 
("IGH").294 IGH was a closely held corporation owned by Jerry 
Zucker and James G. Boyd.29s The plaintiff, ZB Holdings, Inc. ("ZB 
Holdings"), was a corporation formed by Zucker and Boyd to serve 
as a depository for Zucker and Boyd's twenty percent interest in 
IGH.296 ZB Holdings alleged that various injuries had occurred to 
IGH based upon the post-acquisition operation of the corporation 
and asserted claims sounding in common-law fraud and misrepresen-
tation.297 ZB Holdings named BBA, BBA Industrial Textiles, Inc., 
Guthrie North America, Inc., and various individuals as defen-
dants.298 Jurisdiction was based exclusively on diversity of citizen-
ship.299 ZB Holdings was a South Carolina corporation having its 
principal place of business in South Carolina; none of the defendants 
were citizens of South Carolina.3OO IGH, the corporation on whose 
behalf ZB Holdings purported to sue, was neither named as a party 
nor served with process.301 
On April 6, 1992, the defendants moved to dismiss the derivative 
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.302 The defendants 
argued "that IGH was an indispensable party whose joinder was 
291. [d. 
292. [d. 
293. 144 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 




298. [d. at 43-44. 
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required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b) and that IGH should have been 
aligned as a defendant in the action because of the antagonism that 
existed between the plaintiff [ZB Holdings) and the management of 
IGH."303 Since both IGH and ZB Holdings were South Carolina 
corporations, ZB Holdings concluded that joinder would destroy 
complete diversity of citizenship and the federal court would lack 
subject matter jurisdiction.304 The court denied this motion, finding 
that "even if the joinder of IGH destroyed diversity, the court had 
authority to assert supplemental jurisdiction over IGH pursuant to 
[section 1367(a»)."30s 
The defendants then filed another motion to join IGH as a 
party-defendant, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a), renewing the 
argument that joinder was required and would have the effect of 
barring the court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the 
derivative claims under section 1367(b).306 In response to this motion, 
the court acknowledged that it erred when it denied the defendants' 
previous motion to dismiss.307 The court granted the defendants' 
motion to join IGH as a defendant pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
19(b) and, since this joinder served to destroy complete diversity, the 
court dismissed the derivative complaint in its entirety for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.3°S 
In the court's analysis of the situation, it recognized the well-
established rule requiring joinder of the corporation on whose behalf 
a derivative suit is brought. 309 The court stated that "without the 
presence of the corporation complete relief cannot be achieved, and 
the corporation's interests cannot be protected. "310 Therefore, the 
court found that IGH was an indispensable party under Rule 19(b) 
and, accordingly, was required to be joined as a party.311 
Having established this threshold issue, the court then had to 
decide whether to align IGH as a defendant and destroy complete 
diversity, or as a plaintiff, in which case the court would possess 
subject matter jurisdiction over the action. According to the court, 
the general rule is "that the corporation in a derivative suit should 
be aligned as a plaintiff since it is the real party in interest. "312 An 
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as a plaintiff would not provide a 'real collision' of interests. "313 In 
this situation, the court concluded that the requisite antagonism 
existed between the plaintiff, ZB Holdings, and IGH and, therefore, 
it aligned IGH as a defendant.314 The joinder of IGH as a defendant 
destroyed complete diversity, and the court stated "that it lack[ed] 
subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy and the suit must be 
dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) absent some other authority for 
[the] [c]ourt to proceed."315 
The plaintiff argued that section 1367 provided the requisite 
authority for the court to proceed.316 The court, however, was not 
convinced. In determining that it did not have subject matter juris-
diction over the plaintiff's claims, the court curiously sidestepped an 
analysis under section 1367(b) and based its holding on the premise 
that section 1367(a) prevented the exercise of supplemental jurisdic-
tion over this claim.317 The court found that section 1367(a) required 
it to have "original jurisdiction" over the action in order to grant 
supplemental jurisdiction over other constitutionally related claims.318 
The court interpreted "original jurisdiction" to mean "jurisdiction 
in the first instance over a viable lawsuit, without regard to parties 
to be joined later. "319 The court then concluded that "where a 
derivative suit brought in diversity is subject to dismissal for failure 
to join an indispensable, non-diverse party, supplemental jurisdiction 
is not available to join that non-diverse party because, under 1367(a), 
the court never had 'original jurisdiction' over the derivative ac-
tion. "320 
The court's analysis seems strained, and, at the very least, 
incomplete. While it is logical to begin an analysis of a statute by 
looking at the first section to see if it applies, the court should have 
completed the process by addressing the subsequent provisions of 
section 1367(b). As filed, jurisdiction in ZB Holdings was based 
solely upon diversity jurisdiction;321 therefore, it would seem that the 
court did have original jurisdiction over the named parties. The court 
could have simply moved to section 1367(b) which addresses this 
specific situation-cases founded "solely on section 1332 of this 
title."322 Had the court considered section 1367(b), it would have 
313. [d. (quoting Smith v. Sperling, 354.U.S. 91, 97 (1957». 
314. [d. at 47. 
315. [d. 
316. [d. 




321. [d. at 44. 
322. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (Supp. 1991). 
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held that this section prohibited suit in federal court. 323 Instead of 
relying on section 1367(b), the court concluded its confusing analysis 
by defensively stating: 
This court does not believe the new supplemental jurisdiction 
statute was intended to provide a federal forum for deriv-
ative actions in which no federal question is raised or where 
diversity is lacking. If such was Congress' intent, Congress 
should have striven for greater clarity. 324 
If the court had engaged in a section 1367(b) analysis, perhaps 
Congress' intent would have been apparent. 
c. Subsection (c) 
Subsection (c) of section 1367 sets out four grounds upon which 
the court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a 
claim under subsection (a). Subsection (c) states: 
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supple-
mental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if-
(I) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State 
law, 
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim 
or claims over which the district court has original jurisdic-
tion, 
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which 
it has original jurisdiction, or 
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other com-
pelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.32S 
The use of the term "may" in this subdivision indicates that 
the court has discretion.326 However, this discretion only applies in 
four situations, as opposed to the grant of supplemental jurisdiction 
in general. 327 Professor Mengler explains: 
Under subsection (c), a district court may dismiss a supple-
mental claim if it raises a novel or complex issue of state 
law, substantially predominates over the claim or claims 
323. Section 1367(b) states that the "district courts shall not have supplemental 
jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made 
parties under [Rule 19] when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such 
claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 
1332." Id. 
324. ZB Holdings, 144 F.R.D. at 47. 
325. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (Supp. 1991). 
326. Siegel, supra note 4, at 223. 
327. Id. 
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over which the district court has original jurisdiction, or if 
the district court has dismissed all claims over which it had 
original jurisdiction and judicial efficiency does not clearly 
favor adjudicating the supplemental claim. Additionally, the 
subsection accommodates exceptional circumstances, [which 
are not] defined, in which grounds for dismissal of the 
supplemental claim may be compelling.328 
In all of the above instances, "the House Report cautions, that the 
district court in exercising its discretion must undertake a case-specific 
analysis. "329 Subsection (c) thus "codifies those factors that the 
Supreme Court in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs recognized as 
providing a sound basis for a lower court's discretionary decision to 
decline supplemental jurisdiction"330 and the common law doctrine 
of abstention.331 
328. Mengler et al., supra note 106, at 216 (citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 
484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988». 
329. [d. at 216 (citing H.R. REp. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1990), reprinted 
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6873, 6875); see also Siegel, supra note 4, at 224. 
330. Mengler et aI., supra note 106, at 216 (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 
383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966». In Gibbs, Justice Brennan stated that 
[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter 
of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring 
for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law. Certainly, if the 
federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial 
in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well. 
Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. 
331. See Siegel, supra note 4, at 224; see also Oakley, supra note 2, at 766-67 
n.1l8. 
Oakley suggests that the House Report "is misleading insofar as it char-
acterizes the subsection (c) factors as simply a restatement of the factors 
discussed in Gibbs as pertinent to the district court's discretion." Oakley, supra 
note 2, at 767 n.118. According to Oakley, "this is true only of § 1367(c)(2), 
which substantially parallels the second factor discussed in Gibbs." [d. Oakley 
states that § 1367(c)(4) is "substantially narrower ... than the parallel language 
in Gibbs acknowledging that 'there may be reasons independent of jurisdictional 
considerations . . . that would justify separating state and federal claims for 
trial' such that 'jurisdiction ordinarily should be refused.''' [d. (quoting Gibbs, 
383 U.S. at 727). Oakley also asserts that § 1367(c)(3) is narrower than its 
Gibbs counterpart. [d. at 767. Oakley contends that § '1367(c)(3) simply 
"codifies a scenario that Gibbs offered merely as an illustration of the exercise 
of a broader discretion to avoid 'needless decisions of state law.'" [d. (quoting 
Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726). As to § 1367(c)(I), Oakley finds no counterpart in 
Gibbs. [d. at 767. Subsection (c)(1) has language that Oakley describes as 
"language of abstention." [d. For an example of abstention, see Colorado 
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976), 
reiterating that "[a]bstention is also appropriate where there have been pre-
sented difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial 
public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar." 
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Gibbs held that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, 
the court should decline to exercise its discretion to hear the pendenf 
state claim.332 If the federal claim is dismissed on the merits, the 
court has the power to decide the pendent state claim, but Gibbs 
indicated that the exercise of this discretion would be unwise. 333 
"Similarly, if it appears that the state issues substantially predomi-
nate, . . . the state claims may be dismissed without prejudice and 
left for resolution to state tribunals. "334 
The first two clauses of subsection (c), addressing situations in 
which the claim seeking supplemental jurisdiction "raises a novel or 
complex issue of state law or substantially predominates over the 
claim or -claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, 
overlap, as they did under prior law as well as under the so-called 
'abstention' doctrines. "335 "'Abstention' refers to judicially created 
doctrines which 'justify either rejection or postponement of the 
assertion of federal court power even though Congress has vested 
jurisdiction in the federal courts to hear the cases in question." '336 
A federal court might order abstention on various grounds.337 Ab-
stention may be invoked 
(1) [wJhere clarification of state law might avoid a federal 
constitutional ruling (commonly called Pullman absten-
tion);338 (2) where the decision of an unclear issue of state 
law in a diversity case might threaten important state inter-
ests (commonly called Thibodaux abstention);339 (3) where 
an assertion of federal jurisdiction might interfere with 
important state administrative goals (commonly called Bur-
ford abstention);340 (4) where there are simultaneously pend-
332. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. 
333. [d. at 726-27. 
334. [d. 
335. Siegel, supra note 4, at 223-24. 
336. Rex E. Lee & Richard G. Wilkins, An Analysis of Supplemental Jurisdiction 
and Abstention with Recommendations for Legislative Action, 1990 B.Y.U. L. 
REv. 321, 335 (quoting M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE 
ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 233 (1980), and citing New Orleans Pub. Servo 
V. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358 (1989); Iowa Mut. Ins. CO. V. 
LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15, 20-21 (1987); Hawaii Hous. Auth. V. Midkiff, 467 
U.S. 229, 236-37 (1984); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. V. United 
States, 424 U.S. 800, 813, 815, 817 (1976». 
337. For a full discussion on the doctrine of abstention and its origins, see Lee & 
Wilkins, supra note 336, at 335-38. 
338. Lee & Wilkins, supra note 336, at 335 (citing Railroad Comm'n of Tex. V. 
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941». 
339. [d. (citing Louisiana Power & Light CO. V. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 
(1959». 
340. !d. at 335-36 (citin'g Burford V. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943». 
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ing state court proceedings (commonly called Younger 
abstention);341 and (5) where there are duplicative state and 
federal court proceedings (commonly called Colorado River 
abstention). 342 
One commentator, Professor Siegel, notes that the situation 
described in section 1367(c)(1) closely approximates the Pullman 
category of abstention, and he suggests that this section should be 
applied in a manner compatible with Pullman.343 Siegel comments 
that the abstention doctrines are not lightly invoked by federal courts, 
and hopes that the statement of these analogous, if not duplicative, 
bases in section 1367(c) will not encourage any looser application of 
them. 344 
Siegel is particularly wary of section 1367(c)(2), under which a 
state claim dependent upon supplemental jurisdiction may be found 
to predominate over the underlying federal claim which supports 
jurisdiction.34s Under the abstention doctrine, decisions can be found 
that will result in a dismissal rather than merely a stay of the federal 
action. 346 Siegel states that 
[w]hen a dismissal rather than a stay appears to be the 
consequence of an abstention, the bar must hope that the 
courts will be as circumspect now as before in invoking the 
doctrine, either as an "abstention" directly or in the guise 
of a "mere" declination of supplemental jurisdiction under 
[section] 1367(c) when supplemental jurisdiction exists in the 
case. A seemingly innocent declination under section 1367(c) 
can prove just as virulent [to a party asserting a claim] as 
an "abstention" under abstention case law.J47 
Subsection (c)(3), which allows the district court to decline 
supplemental jurisdiction where it has dismissed all claims over which 
it had original jurisdiction, conforms with substantial prior case 
law.348 Embodied in this clause is a considerable degree of discre-
tion. 349 Siegel suggests that a court's decision regarding whether a 
dismissal of the original claim (or remand in a removal situation) 
341. [d. at 336 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971». 
342. [d. (citing Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 
800 (1976». 
343. Siegel, supra note 4, at 224; see also Administaff, Inc. v. Kaster, 799 F. Supp. 
685,690 (W.O. Tex. 1992). But cf. Oakley, supra note 2, at 767 n.1l8 (stating 
that clause (1) of § 1367 resembles Colorado River abstention). 
344. Siegel, supra note 4, at 224. 
345. [d. 
346. [d. (citing Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943». 
347. [d. at 224. 
348. See generally id. 
349. [d. 
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"should bring about a dismissal of the dependent claim for want of 
supplemental jurisdiction should depend on the moment within the 
litigation when the dismissal of the original claim takes place, and 
on the other surrounding circumstances. "350 For example, Siegel notes 
that 
if the main claim is dismissed early in the action before any 
substantial preparation has gone into the dependent claims, 
dismissing or remanding the latter upon declining supple-
mental jurisdiction seems fair. But, if the dismissal of the 
main claim occurs late in the action, after there has indeed 
been substantial expenditure in time, effort and money in 
preparing the dependent claims, [declining supplemental ju-
risdiction] may not be fair, nor is it by any means necessary. 
The discretion implicit in the word "may" in subdivision 
(c) of 1367 permits the district court to weigh and balance 
all of these factors. 351 
Subsection (c)(4) was included as a final ground under which a 
court "can decline supplemental jurisdiction in other 'exceptional 
circumstances' that present 'compelling reasons. "'352 The House Re-
port states that subsection (c)(4) "acknowledges that occasionally 
there may exist other compelling reasons for a district court to decline 
supplemental jurisdiction, which the subsection does not foreclose a 
court from considering in exceptional circumstances. "353 In his anal-
ysis, Siegel states that "[r]ather than constitut[ing] a separate category 
for declining supplemental jurisdiction, distinct from the first three, 
the language of clause (4) indicates that all declinations of supple-
mental jurisdiction should be reserved for situations in which there 
are 'compelling reasons.' "354 
Siegel's analysis, however, does not seem completely accurate in 
light of the language of the House Report. While courts declining 
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under section 1367(c)(4) must 
do so only in compelling circumstances, the language of the House 
Report indicates that this clause does indeed constitute a separate 
ground for dismissal. Contrary to Siegel's position, this clause au-
thorizes a court to use its discretion, but limits the exercise of such 
discretion with the "exceptional circumstances" requirement. 
Several courts have availed themselves of the provisions of 
section 1367(c).3SS Three significant decisions discussing section 1367(c) 
350. [d. 
35l. [d. 
352. [d.; see also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 727 (1966) (stating 
that one reason to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction for excep-
tional circumstances includes the likelihood of jury confusion). 
353. H.R. REp. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6873, 6875. 
354. Siegel, supra note 4, at 224-25. 
355. See Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1992) (dismissing 
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include Perkins v. City oj Phiiadelphia,3S6 Rosen v. Chang,3S7 and 
James v. Sun Glass Hut oj California. 3S8 In Perkins, the district 
court, following the dismissal of federal civil rights claims, declined 
to exercise pendent jurisdiction over a state law negligence claim and 
remanded the case to the state court.359 The negligence claim was 
brought by the mother of the decedent against the police department, 
alleging that the department had conducted an inadequate investi-
gation regarding the decedent's disappearance.360 
state claims in a § 1983 case under § 1367(c)(3) after the federal question claims 
had been dismissed); Packett v. Stenberg, 969 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(affirming district court's declination under § 1367(c)(3) to exercise jurisdiction 
over a purely state claim determining whether an assistant attorney general, 
who was in a policy-making position, was protected from termination by the 
newly elected Attorney General); Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 
111 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that once state law claims against University 
officials in their official capacity had been remanded to state court, the district 
court properly remanded the same state law individual capacity claims under 
§ 1367(c)(4», cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1067 (1993); Administaff, Inc. v. Kaster, 
799 F. Supp. 685 (W.O. Tex. 1992) (remanding, in the context of a § 1983 
case, related state claims under §§ 1367(c)(1) & (c)(2) because the state claims 
predominated; novel issues of state law existed; and resolution of the state law 
claims made a determination of federal constitutional claims unnecessary); Mill 
Inv., Inc. v. Brooks Woolen Co., 797 F. Supp. 49 (D. Me. 1992) (holding that 
while court had the power to extend supplemental jurisdiction over the action 
even where the basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction was lost, the court 
also had the power to order the case remanded under § 1367(c»; Arawana 
Mills, Co. v. United Tech. Corp., 795 F. Supp. 1238 (D. Conn. 1992) (allowing 
supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state law claims in a case involving 
CERCLA, and rejecting the defendant's argument that it should decline to do 
so under §§ 1367(c)(1) & (2»; Freiburger v. Emery Air Charter, Inc., 795 F. 
Supp. 253 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (dismissing claims under § 1367(c) because the claims 
of retaliatory discharge and discharge for participation in a union did not arise 
from a common nucleus of fact); Carlucci v. United States, 793 F. Supp. 482 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (declining to grant supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(I) 
over a third-party state law contribution claim); Lahaza v. Azeff, 790 F. Supp. 
88 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (declining to apply supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(3) 
to state law claims where it had dismissed the federal question claims); Anspec 
Co. v. Iohnson Controls, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (declining 
to apply supplemental jurisdiction under §§ 1367(c)(I)-(2) to state law claims 
in a CERCLA case because state law claims substantially predominated over 
the CERCLA claim and raised novel and complex issues of state law); Manela 
v. Gottlieb, 784 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (declining to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(3) over state law claims after it dismissed the 
federal claim alleging violations of securities laws); Hudson County News Co. 
v. Metro Assocs., 141 F.R.D. 386 (D. Mass. 1992) (declining to assert supple-
mental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(2) in a federal declaratory action filed under 
RICO over additional related claims already pending in a state court action). 
356. 766 F. Supp. 313 (E.D. Pa. 1991). 
357. 758 F. Supp. 799 (D.R.I. 1991). 
358. 799 F. Supp. 1083 (D. Colo. 1992). 
359. Perkins, 766 F. Supp. at 318. 
360. Id. at 314. 
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The lawsuit, initially brought in state court, was removed to 
federal court by the defendants because, in addition to a state 
negligence claim, th'e plaintiff alleged violations of federal law under 
section 1983.361 The Perkins court, relying on sections 1367(c)(1) and 
(c)(3), declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the negli-
gence claim because the complex issues raised by the state law 
negligence action had not been previously decided by state courts 
and the federal claims had been dismissed. 362 In reaching its decision 
to remand, the court cited Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill,363 
and held that a federal district court could remand a properly 
removed case to state court when only the state law claims remained 
to be litigated. 364 The Perkins court stated that "[u]nder Cohill, we 
have the power to remand the case; under the balancing test of 
Gibbs, we deem it prudent to do SO."365 Further, the court stated 
that "Congress codified the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction and the 
case law of Gibbs and Cohill in . . . [section] 1367. "366 
In Rosen v. Chang,367 the court, citing section 1367(c), stated 
that "it is within a court's discretion to exercise supplemental juris-
diction."368 The court commented that it was "concerned about the 
potential confusion in the jurors' minds when they must consider 
both the Eighth Amendment standard for Count I and the negligence 
standard for Count 11."369 Using a balancing test, the court deter-
mined that "[s]uch concerns, however, are outweighed by the fur-
therance of judicial economy in trying these closely related claims 
together, particularly when clear jury instructions may alleviate any 
juror confusion." 370 In its discretion, the court chose to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the wrongful death claim.371 
In James v. Sun Glass Hut of California, Inc.,m the plaintiff 
alleged that she was terminated from her employment because of age 
discrimination.373 In her second through seventh claims for relief, the 
plaintiff alleged breach of contract, promissory estoppel, fraud, 
negligent misrepresentation, bad faith, and outrageous conduct. 374 
361. [d, at 315. 
362. [d, at 317-18, 
363. 484 U.S. 343 (1988). 
364. Perkins, 766 F. Supp. at 317. 
365. [d. 
366. [d. 
367. 758 F. Supp. 799 (D.R.I. 1991). 




372. 799 F. Supp. 1083 (D. Colo. 1992). 
373. [d. at 1084. 
374. [d. 
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Jurisdiction existed only by virtue of plaintiff's federal Age Discrim-
ination in Employment Act claim. m In determining whether to allow 
supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law claims, the 
court began with the premise that "[t]he decision whether to exercise 
pendent jurisdiction has traditionally been a matter within the court's 
discretion."376 The court then recognized "[b]ecause [section] 1367 
codifies pendent jurisdiction, the discretionary element is necessarily 
retained."377 The court acknowledged that '''the statute also cabins 
that discretion by mandating that supplemental jurisdiction be exer-
cised unless one of the categories in section 1367(c) is met. "'378 In 
reviewing section 1367(c), the court stated that the state law claims 
clearly predominate over the lone federal claim. Plaintiff's 
contract and fraud claims required elements of proof that 
were distinct and foreign to her ADEA claim. These claims 
would substantially expand the scope of this case. Moreover, 
all the state law claims involve [d) damages not available 
under ADEA, again causing a substantial expansion of this 
action beyond that necessary and relevant to the federal 
claim.379 . 
Therefore, the court concluded that the state law claims substantially 
predominated over the federal claim and declined to exercise its 
supplemental jurisdiction under section 1367(c)(2).380 
D. Subsection (d) 
Subsection (d) extends the limitations period for supplemental 
claims dismissed under section 1367 as well as other claims dismissed 
in the same action. Subsection (d) provides: 
(d) The period of limitations for any claim asserted under 
subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same action 
that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after 
the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be 
tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 
days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a 
longer tolling period.381 
If, pursuant to subsection (c), a district court dismisses a party's 
supplemental claim, a party may choose to refile that claim in state 
375. [d. 
376. [d. (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966». 
377. [d. (citing Cedillo v. Valcar Enter., 773 F. Supp. 932, 940 (N.D. Tex. 1991». 
378. [d. (quoting Cedillo, 773 F. Supp. at 940) (emphasis in James). 
379. [d. at 1085. 
380. [d. 
381. 28 U.S.c. § 1367(d) (Supp. 1991). 
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court. In addition, if a supplemental claim is dismissed pursuant to 
subsection (c), a party may move to dismiss without prejudice his or 
her other claims for the purpose of refiling the entire action in state 
court. 382 
A party who wishes to refile a clafm in state court after it has 
been dismissed by the federal court may face a statute of limitations 
problem.383 To address this situation, section 1367(d) provides: 
a 30 day period of tolling of statutes of limitations [or 
defers to the specific state's statute of limitations if that 
period is longer than 30 days] for any supplemental claim 
that is dismissed under [section 1367] and for any other 
claims in the same action voluntarily dismissed at the same 
time or after the supplemental claim is dismissed. 384 
The purpose of subsection (d) is to prevent the loss of claims to 
state statutes of limitations, which do not toll with respect to sup-
plemental claims pending in federal court.38S Section 1367(d) proce-
382. See Mengler et aI., supra note 106, at 216; Siegel, supra note 4, at 225-26. 
Mengler and Siegel note that the standards developed under FED. R. CIY. P. 
41(a) govern whether a motion to dismiss should be granted. Mengler et aI., 
supra note 106, at 216; Siegel, supra note 4, at 225-26. Rule 41(a) provides: 
(a) Voluntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof. 
(1) By Plaintiff; by Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule 
23(e), of Rule 66, and of any statute of the United States, an action 
may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing 
a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party 
of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first 
occurs, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties 
who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice 
of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except 
that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits 
when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of the 
United States or of any state an action based on or including the 
same claim. 
(2) By Order of Court. Except as provided in paragraph (I) of 
this subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the 
plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms 
and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been 
pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon the defendant of 
the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed 
against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain 
pending for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise 
specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without 
prejudice. 
FED. R. CIY. P. 41(a). 
383. See Mengler et a1., supra note 106, at 216. 
384. H.R. REp. No. 734, IOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6873, 6875-76. 
385. Mengler et aI., supra note 106, at 216 (citing H.R. REp. No. 734, 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6875-76). 
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dure also eliminates any disincentive by a plaintiff to present an 
entire case to a state court after a federal court has dismissed the 
supplemental claim.386 
The House Report regarding section 1367(d) states that if a 
federal court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a 
state claim. and that state claim "reaches final judgment in the state 
court before the federal district court has resolved the claims over 
which it retained jurisdiction. "387 the federal court "should accord 
no claim preclusive effect to a state court judgment on the dismissed 
supplemental claim. "388 The statute's drafters. Mengler. BurbC\Ilk and 
Rowe. note that a "state court['s] determinations on common issues 
could provide a basis for issue preclusion in the federal action. "389 
For an example of a case in which section 1367(d) was discussed 
see Freer v. Mayer. 390 In Freer. because the state claims tended to 
predominate over the federal claim. the court dismissed the federal 
claim.391 Relying upon sections 1367(c)(2) and (c)(3). the court also 
dismissed the state claims.392 The court acknowledged that the "plain-
tiff suffers no prejudice by this dismissal. He may refile his state 
law claims within six months of this decision [under 1367(d)]."393 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A number of critics have asserted that section 1367 is "poorly 
drafted. creating ambiguity for cases that formerly were clear and 
creating numerous problems in others. "394 Thomas Arthur and Ri-
chard Freer suggest that these ambiguities stem from the quick 
passage of the statute at the end of a congressional session and the 
absence of a "thorough public ventilation and congressional scru-
tiny. "395 
Quite frankly. supplemental· jurisdiction is a complex area of 
the law. Before the statute's enactment. the rules were developed 
through years of case law. In addition. the various judicial decisions 
were far from uniform. Through the enactment of section 1367. 
Congress not only clarified but also codified the case law prior to 
Finley. thereby reversing Finley's erosion of federal court jurisdiction. 
Section 1367. therefore. serves as a single source of authority to be 
386. [d. 
387. Mengler et aI., supra note 106, at 216. 
388. H.R. REp. No. 734, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6876. 
389. Mengler et aI., supra note 106, at 216. 
390. 796 F. Supp. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
391. [d. 
392. [d. at 94. 
393. [d. 
394. Arthur & Freer, Burnt Straws, supra note 3, at 964. 
395. [d. 
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used in determining under what circumstances a federal court must 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction and when a federal court may 
decline to exercise jurisdiction over supplemental claims. By passing 
this statute, Congress reinstated the federal courts as accessible 
forums for the resolution of entire cases or controversies that present 
claims outside of the courts' original federal jurisdiction. 
On the other hand, the statute provides little definitive guidance 
in a number of areas, particularly with respect to the implementation 
of section 1367(b). Several courts have misapplied the statute-an 
indication that the statute could be drafted more clearly. Further 
commentary and a body of case law accurately interpreting section 
1367(b) are necessary before one can expect uniform application in 
the courts and an accurate understanding within the bar. Ultimately, 
the achievement of less complicated rules regarding supplemental 
jurisdiction inherently depends upon continued reform in the legis-
lature and in the judiciary. Significantly, section 1367 represents one 
important step in the process of reformation and simplification. 
M. Ashley Harder 
